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The Purnawirawan and Party  
Development in Post-Authoritarian  
Indonesia, 1998–2014 
M Faishal Aminuddin 
Abstract: This study examines the role played by purnawirawan (retired 
military officers) in political party development in post-authoritarian 
Indonesia from 1998 to 2014. The role of purnawirawan remains a critical 
research gap in the literature on democratisation in post-authoritarian 
Indonesia, particularly in studies which focus on civilian–military rela-
tions. The article finds that purnawirawan have had a significant impact on 
the creation of a new type of party – one which combines military-
centred leadership and civilian-controlled management. This new ar-
rangement has enabled these former military officers to protect their 
interests. This study contributes to the existing literature on the impact 
of military reform on the increasing numbers of purnawirawan turning to 
civilian politics in order to maintain influence via electoral political con-
testation in the context of democratic transition.  
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Introduction 
After 1998, Indonesia underwent a transition to democracy. New politi-
cal procedures were introduced, supporting democratic institutions were 
built, and cultural changes happened.1 Yet the nation still falls short of 
fulfilling the criteria of a consolidated democracy. In 2016 Indonesia was 
classified a “defective democracy” by the Bertelsmann Transformation 
Index (BTI).2 In countries that have undergone a period of reform, trac-
es of authoritarianism typically linger on – in Indonesia, there has been 
no exception. During the early part of its transition period (1998–2004), 
Indonesia made slow progress, particularly in establishing democratic 
institutions. This was due to the number of military figures who tried to 
restore the former centralised regime (Kingsbury 2005). Thus despite the 
decline in actual representation of the military in government branches 
after 1998, the military still managed to impede attempts at political re-
form (Crouch 2007, 2010; Honna 2003). 
The share of military officers in cabinet posts fell from 14.8 per cent 
in 1998 to 9.8 per cent in 2004. In the legislative branch this share was 
8.5 per cent from 1998 to 2004 and dropped to 3.1 per cent thereafter. 
In addition, the number of active duty military who were deployed to 
politics and served as provincial governors plummeted from 43.8 per 
cent during the New Order to 0 per cent in the period that followed 
(Croissant, Kuehn, and Lorenz 2012). On top of that, with its candidates 
failing to win elections, the military began losing its influence in local 
governance (Mietzner 2009). These factors weakened the military’s polit-
ical influence in various state agencies. In 2004, immediately after the 
Law No. 34/2004 on the Indonesian National Armed Forces (Tentara 
Nasional Indonesia, TNI) was issued, the military returned to its initial 
role as a professional organisation. 
Purnawirawan involvement and consolidation in politics gained mo-
mentum when Yudhoyono ran for president in 2004. It should be noted, 
however, that other notable purnawirawan from Suharto’s circle had also 
previously established political parties and participated in the 1999 gen-
                                                 
1  I would like to thank Aurel Croissant, John Sidel, and Marcus Mietzner for 
their valuable contributions to earlier drafts of this article.  
2  Acquired from Bertelsmann Transformation Index Country Report 2016. The index 
measures a country’s democracy status according to five indicators: political 
and social integration, stability of democratic institutions, and political partici-
pation (Indonesia scored 7.0 on each); rule of law (6.3); and stateness (7.3). In-
donesia had an overall score of 6.9 and was thus categorised as “limited.” Fur-
ther details on this assessment can be found at <www.bti-project.org>. 
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eral election. One of these figures was General Hartono, who founded 
the Concern for the Nation Functional Party (Partai Karya Peduli Bangsa, 
PKPB). Others joined civilian-led political parties such as the Indonesian 
Democratic Party of Struggle (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan, 
PDIP) and the Party of the Functional Groups (Partai Golongan Karya, 
Golkar). 
Although purnawirawan still have power, it is limited to individuals. 
Many have sought to maintain their ability to influence state policies 
through democratic procedures, while various notable purnawirawan have 
run as candidates in presidential, gubernatorial, and local government 
elections. Civilian politicians are well aware of this group’s interests and 
recognise their influence and networks; therefore, many have appointed 
purnawirawan to strategic positions in political parties. Purnawirawan are 
still able to use their networks, collaborate with purnawirawan counter-
parts as well as civilian politicians and businesspeople, and establish 
cartels – not only in the political arena but also in the economic arena. 
Some purnawirawan founded their own political parties in order to exist 
politically and compete in elections.  
From 1998 to 2014, purnawirawan continued to play an important 
role in elections and political parties. During Suharto’s authoritarian New 
Order regime (1966–1998), the military’s power was based not only on 
the strength of its institutions but also on its function as a supervisor of 
political parties. Under Suharto the military and its main political organi-
sation, Golkar, became increasingly reliant on procedural elements as the 
basis of authority – a point that is indicative of the regime’s strength and 
its political legitimisation (Alagappa 1995: 53). After the collapse of the 
regime, the military retained a strong influence in politics. Rinakit (2005) 
reveals the significant effect military power has on democratisation, 
while Sebastian (2006) shows how a developing military doctrine linked 
the military institution to active-military sociocultural aspects, such as 
corps soul. Meanwhile, Mietzner (2009) reveals how the military’s at-
tempts to intervene in the political arena can be linked to the relationship 
between Islam and military politics (Mietzner 2009). Ufen (2008) notes 
the impact of political streams (aliran) within the party system and how it 
was reconfigured by the military.  
Overall, many studies have sought to understand the civil–military 
relationship, military politics, and the political parties themselves in In-
donesia during the democratic transition and the consolidation periods. 
Important subjects include the influence of indigenous military officers 
on the political direction of the military (Chandra and Kammen 2002) 
and the reorganisation of the power of the political elite and the patri-
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monial oligarchy (Hadiz 2003; Aspinall 2013; Webber 2006; Fukuoka 
2013; Case 2007). Other studies have focused on political development, 
the cartelisation of parties, and democratic institutions undergoing 
change during the transition period (Ghoshal 2004; Slater 2004; Tan 
2006; Ufen 2008; Liddle and Mujani 2009). King (2003) mentions three 
factors that may neutralise and control any hardliner faction – namely, 
modes of transition, extensive mass mobilisation driving the transition, 
and the success of moderate factions in the military. Even in the 1999 
and 2004 elections, some of the support provided by political parties was 
still characterised by Islamic ideological streams (Ratnawati and Harris 
2008). Furthermore, Ufen (2006) argues that stream aliran politics began 
losing political significance and started experiencing a dealignment when 
“presidentialised” parties emerged and authoritarianism within the party 
body grew. Meanwhile, the public’s perception of leadership and the 
issue of party identification were still more significant than other varia-
bles, such as religious orientation and political economy (Liddle and 
Mujani 2007).  
Tan (2006) found that Indonesian parties and the party system re-
vealed the strengths and weaknesses of legitimacy. The institutionalisa-
tion of parties was hindered by strong personal figures in the presidential 
election and the election of local government heads. Nevertheless, in 
terms of accountability, progress was made because the electoral system 
enabled voters to reward and punish parties and political leaders. In 
terms of party organisation, the Islamic-based Prosperous Justice Party 
(Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, PKS) and National Awakening Party (Partai 
Kebangkitan Bangsa, PKB) showed a higher degree of party cohesion 
than other Islamic or secular parties (Noor 2012). Having studied how 
political parties manage their activities, administration, and changes in 
membership at the local level, Fionna (2014) concludes that parties have 
different degrees of cohesion. There remains, however, a research gap in 
the literature as none of the above-mentioned studies explain the role of 
purnawirawan political actors, their connection with the military reform, or 
their influence in political parties. 
Only two studies have looked at the role of purnawirawan. The first, 
by Terence Lee (2015), examines the role of retired high-ranking officers, 
especially of notable generals, who participated in presidential elections 
in Indonesia. Lee deems the retired generals to be strategic players in 
presidential elections but seemingly did not conduct extensive research 
on exactly what retired officers contributed to political parties or how 
their role impacted party development during democratisation. The sec-
ond study, by Arie Soesilo (2013), seeks to identify sociological factors 
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that caused retired generals to enter the political stage. Soesilo notes that 
purnawirawan who participated in elections retained military characteristics 
(e.g. doctrine, discipline, and networking) aimed at serving the nation. 
Soesilo argues that purnawirawan hold personal idealistic motives rather 
than pragmatic ones and generally tend to support the process of demo-
cratic consolidation.  
Based on the two aforementioned studies, the current paper seeks 
to answer two questions: First, how extensive was the role of purnawira-
wan in democratisation through their engagement in political parties? 
Second, what impact did their role have on the development of political 
parties? This case study was conducted in Indonesia and included the 
transition period from 1998 to 2004 and the consolidation period from 
2004 to 2014. The analysis here was performed using a dataset consisting 
of a profile of purnawirawan. The data includes party affiliation and candi-
dacy for both executive and legislative offices and was collected from 
official party documents, newspaper and magazine sources, and the ac-
cessible sources of military institutions. This study represents an attempt 
to understand the impact of military reform on the configuration of 
civil–military relations in post-New Order Indonesia and the dynamics 
of purnawirawan within political parties. It also seeks to explain the reor-
ganisation of the political forces that generated new maps of fragmenta-
tion among political elites and in party development. 
The remainder of this study consists of three parts. The first part 
explains military reform as a historical institutional factor that influenced 
the development of political parties during post-authoritarian democrati-
sation. The second part presents the dataset used to illustrate the distri-
bution and polarisation of purnawirawan in political parties. The data 
provide evidence that purnawirawan retained a strong interest in politics 
even after the military’s official control of politics had been abolished. 
The trend towards polarisation also indicates that networking among 
politicians with military backgrounds took place. The third part draws on 
the analysis to explain the development of political parties in post-New 
Order Indonesia, focusing on when purnawirawan established or joined 
political parties.  
Military Reform and Party Development in  
Indonesia  
Party development was shaped by historical factors, many of which were 
related to the underlying preconditions (e.g. the previous system, actors, 
and lingering effects of authoritarian legacy) of democratisation and 
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influenced by individuals or the institutional regime of the previous peri-
od. Ishiyama and Kennedy’s (2001) study of party development in the 
former Soviet Union notes that the major obstacle in the development 
process was the legacy of totalitarianism. Party development contains a 
unique blend of extra-parliamentary movements and elite-focused ele-
ments. The elite constellation could explain the model and form of party 
development, including the various problems that exist therein. Western 
democracies have produced a model of party development based on a 
reactive dialectic that involves interaction between parties and their roots 
in social, economic, and political spheres (Katz and Mair 1995). By con-
trast, in democratisation outside the Western tradition, party develop-
ment is based on the retroactive dynamics of the legacy of authoritarian-
ism.  
Indonesian democratisation (1998–2004) encouraged purnawirawan 
to create new models of organisation that combined patterns of militarist 
leadership and civilian politicians’ institutionalisation of party constituen-
cies. The respective constituency bases included not only military and 
military family members but also those from different religious and pro-
fessional backgrounds. Military leadership patterns were also reflected in 
these party organisations, with purnawirawan holding strategic leadership 
positions and varying degrees of authority to control the direction of 
party policy. Purnawirawan-controlled parties are not only surviving, they 
are thriving due to having national coverage, constituencies that extend 
beyond a particular base, and the authority to engage in extensive party 
institutionalisation.  
There are two important historical factors that need to be taken into 
account when explaining the role of purnawirawan in political parties and 
party development more generally: (i) the reform of the military as an 
institution and (ii) reforms conducted within the military. These factors 
affected the distribution and polarisation of purnawirawan in political 
parties. Military reform was one of the mandates of the 1998 Reformasi 
movement. Although arguments regarding the implementation of this 
reform were varied, they reached similar conclusions – for example, the 
military doctrine of dual function (dwifungsi) did not change substantially 
between 1998 and 2004 (Honna 2003). However, some other scholars 
consider the internal military reforms to have been quite significant 
(Crouch 2010; Mietzner 2006).  
There are two major types of military reform that I wish to empha-
sise here. The first is politically led military reform, which is guided by 
presidential decisions reached in agreement with Parliament. There were 
three presidential regimes during the democratic transition period, all of 
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which experienced different levels of progress and achievements in rela-
tion to their reforms. The second is militarily led military reform, guided 
by the armed forces commander-in-chief. Both types of reform pro-
duced fairly concrete results and three crucial achievements: (a) the with-
drawal of military support for Golkar in 1998, (b) the withdrawal of 
military representatives, military factions, and police factions from Par-
liament, and (c) the institutionalisation of reform within the military 
through fundamental changes to military praetorian doctrine and the 
establishment of a professional military. 
During the transition period (1998–2004), three presidential regimes 
made specific contributions to military reforms with their policies. Be-
tween 1998 and 1999 Habibie’s government reduced military power in 
Parliament and the civilian bureaucracy. For instance, in 1998 there were 
75 high-ranking officers with privileged seats in the House of Represent-
atives (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, DPR), but this number was reduced to 
38 in 1999. Moreover, Law No. 3/1999 on the Composition and Posi-
tions of the People’s Assembly (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat, MPR), 
the DPR, and the Regional Representative Bodies (Dewan Perwakilan 
Rakyat Daerah, DPRD) reduced the number of military seats in the DPR 
(Honna 2003: 165). At the same time, MPR seats were also cut from 
1,000 to 700 (500 DPR members, 135 functional group members, and 65 
regional representatives) (Ufen 2002: 514).  
In 2004 the armed forces headquarters accepted the political deci-
sion to withdraw all 1,047 of their members from the parliaments at 
different levels. The removed members had the option of returning to 
active military duty or resigning from the military. Not all chose to join a 
political party, as most of the parties only accommodated middle-ranked 
and senior officers. The process of withdrawal was controlled directly by 
military headquarters in Jakarta. On 28 June 2004 the commander-in-
chief of the armed forces issued regulation STR/1064/2004, which end-
ed the assignment of active military personnel to the national and local 
parliaments. 
The military’s involvement in politics has officially been over since 
the Law on the TNI was passed in 2004. The military no longer has the 
ability to influence the formulation of policies or legislative processes in 
Parliament. Since the introduction of this legislation, military personnel 
have been prohibited from becoming members of a political party, being 
active in political contests or business activities, and being elected to the 
legislative or executive branches (Law 34/2004). Furthermore, initial 
reforms by the military establishment emphasised neutrality in local elec-
tions by banning TNI members from being nominated to participate in 
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these elections. In fact, according to regulation STR/222/2005, the mili-
tary is not allowed to participate, facilitate, or use military resources to 
support a campaign or to provide any assistance to an ex-military candi-
date. 
The military reforms implemented between 1998 and 2004 con-
tained important changes that enforced military neutrality in politics. 
External reforms tended to push military personnel to leave politics, 
while internal reforms showed the institutionalisation of neutrality in 
military organisations. Armed forces were no longer able to support 
purnawirawan, who had previously held strategic positions in the military 
and were still concerned with maintaining their influence on politics. 
Furthermore, as an institution, party politics was not well established at 
the bottom level of party management. In terms of quality, political par-
ties in Indonesia spend more time considering unresolved internal prob-
lems, the poor track record of parliamentary members, and the high rate 
of corruption than looking at ways to better develop their parties (Tomsa 
2010). Tan (2002) discusses the impact of low party performance, noting 
that during the post-Suharto regime, antipathy towards political parties 
was commonplace due to widespread corruption. The impact of military 
reforms and the lack of accountability of political parties can be seen as 
an additional factor that caused purnawirawan to remain engaged in party 
politics.  
Distribution of Purnawirawan in Political Parties, 
1998–2014 
According to data collected from 1998 to 2014, at least 388 purnawirawan 
entered political competitions and were distributed based on party affilia-
tion (Dataset Military Retirees, 2014). Table 1 shows that 255 purnawira-
wan were active in political parties – 61 of whom ran as independent 
candidates in executive elections. Most were concentrated in the Demo-
cratic Party (Partai Demokrat) and the Hanura Party (Partai Hati Nurani 
Rakyat), while the rest were scattered among various smaller parties that 
competed in the elections of 1999 and 2004. Numerous candidates from 
the navy were found in the Gerindra Party (Partai Gerakan Indonesia 
Raya), followed by the PKPB, the Indonesian Justice and Unity Party 
(Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan Indonesia, PKPI), and other smaller 
parties. The Golkar Party had more air force purnawirawan than any other 
branch. There were large numbers of police in the PDIP and the Na-
tional Mandate Party (Partai Amanat Nasional, PAN).  
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The purnawirawan networks within party politics can be categorised 
into three main groups: (1) Suharto loyalists who founded the PKPI and 
the PKPB, (2) pro-reform ex-officers, divided between supporters of 
Golkar and the Democratic Party, and (3) ex-officers outside the socio-
political support system and Suharto’s Golkar. They were incorporated 
into many new parties controlled by civilian politicians, like the PDIP.  
Table 1. Distribution of Purnawirawan in Political Parties  
Last Rank Demo-
cratic 
Party 
Gerin-
dra 
Gol-
kar 
Hanu-
ra 
Inde-
pendent 
Nas-
dem 
PAN 
Major general 22 9 8 5 3 3  
Colonel 9 4 1  14 1 3 
Brigadier 
general 10 4 3 7 2 3 5 
Lieutenant 
colonel 1    12  1 
Lieutenant 
general 3 3 4 1 3   
Inspector 
general 1   1 5 3 1 
Rear admiral 1 1 2  1 1 1 
General (army 
and police) 2  1 3  1  
Vice admiral 2  2 1 1 1  
Senior com-
missioner  1   1 1 2 
Air vice mar-
shal   1     
Captain 1   1 3   
Commissioner 
general 1    2   
Commodore 1  2  1   
Air commo-
dore  1     1 
Adjunct senior 
commissioner 1    2 1  
Commissioner     1  1 
Major     3   
Air marshal  2  1    
Admiral 1   1  1  
Air chief 
marshal 1       
First lieutenant        
Second lieu-
tenant     1   
Total 57 25 24 21 61 16 15 
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Last Rank PBB PBR PDIP PDK PKB PKPB PKPI PPP 
Major general  4 11  3 4 1 2 
Colonel 2 1 4 2 2 5 4 1 
Brigadier general  1 3   4 1  
Lieutenant 
colonel   2 2  1 1 1 
Lieutenant 
general 3      1 1 
Inspector gen-
eral 1  3      
Rear admiral      2   
General (army 
and police)   1   1 2  
Vice admiral         
Senior commis-
sioner 2   1     
Air vice marshal 1 1  1 1 1   
Captain         
Commissioner 
general 1  1      
Commodore  1  1   1  
Air commodore      3 1  
Adjunct senior 
commissioner 1        
Commissioner         
Major   1      
Air marshal         
Admiral  1       
Air chief mar-
shal         
First lieutenant         
Second lieuten-
ant         
Total 11 9 26 7 6 21 12 5 
Note:  Not affiliated=38, Other party=34, > 5 FMOs=361, N=388. Source: Dataset on 
Indonesian Military Retirement in Politics, 1998–2014; calculated by author. 
Although there are fewer purnawirawan than civilian politicians, relatively 
speaking they hold a greater number of strategic positions than their 
civilian counterparts – something that is yet to be analysed in the context 
of purnawirawan influence in party politics. In their respective parties 
purnawirawan held three important positions: (i) chairperson (ketua umum) 
of the party or advisory board, (ii) chairperson of the executive board 
(dewan pimpinan pusat), and (iii) head of the party bodies. Despite some 
differences, these three positions generally provided the holders with a 
significant amount of authority to move the wheels of the party organisa-
tion. 
In the post-Reformasi period, purnawirawan established several major 
parties: the Democratic Party, Gerindra, Hanura, the PKPI, and the 
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PKPB. Purnawirawan used various high-level board positions to control 
the structures and daily decisions of these parties.  
Three Phases of Party Development 
During the period of democratic consolidation (2004–2014), the military 
practised neutrality in elections and broke off political relations with 
Golkar. This impacted the political influence of the armed forces, espe-
cially that of senior officers who had held strategic positions. Military 
politics that had previously been conducted behind closed doors in Par-
liament were now being channelled through other political outlets. Gol-
kar, where various purnawirawan occupied positions during their active 
service, remained one such outlet. Golkar was a strategic option because 
the party’s vote was relatively stable despite some military factions in 
Suharto’s line – such as General (ret) Hartono – preferring to build a 
new party as a political vehicle. Furthermore, other Suharto loyalists, 
such as General (ret) Edi Sudrajat and General (ret) Try Sutrisno, were 
still using the PKPI to garner support from the military and their families. 
However, the party they founded failed to get a significant share of the 
vote in the 1999 and 2004 elections because of its limited constituency 
base, high degree of military leadership, control of the party by a 
purnawirawan elite, and lack of provisions to include civilian politicians in 
the party-building process. 
In the context of party development, a new phenomenon saw par-
ties not only being led by civilian politicians but also controlled by 
purnawirawan. This was due to the desire to instil military values into such 
parties’ organisation, and purnawirawan had the necessary experience. 
After 1998, Golkar became more open and started to allow military fac-
tions into the party, meaning its structure could not be dominated as it 
had been under the New Order regime. Civilian politicians managed the 
party from the central office, while purnawirawan – as a continuation of 
the military faction – were incorporated into the party structure. Howev-
er, civilian control and military style were incompatible when it came to 
the party developing a platform and orientating itself politically during 
democratisation, which made Golkar more open and sensitive to de-
mands. 
Those who joined other parties played different roles. Overall, how-
ever, parties recruited purnawirawan as board members to provide assis-
tance or meet with party experts to cover skills and technocratic gaps. 
Some purnawirawan were used to strengthen party organisation and intel-
ligence strategies in elections.  
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Table 2.  Party Development by the Purnawirawan in Post-Authoritarian 
Indonesia  
Character-
istic 
Phase I Phase II Phase III 
Precondi-
tion  
Post-authoritarian condi-
tion with Reformasi 
movement 
a. Abolition of dual func-
tion as a military doctrine 
b. Termination of Golkar 
from military line 
Democratic transition 
a. Elimination of military 
representative position in 
Parliament 
b. Passing of Law No. 
34/2004 on TNI, estab-
lishing professional military
Democratisa-
tion settlement 
a. Passing of law 
related to direct 
presidential 
election and 
electoral system 
b. Establish-
ment of Consti-
tutional Court 
Purnawira-
wan Diaspo-
ra 
Build High-
ly Militarist 
Party 
(HMP) 
Join Civil-
ian Party 
(CP)  
Build Semi-
Militarist 
Party 
(SMP) 
Join Civil-
ian Party 
Build Militarist 
Party (MP) 
Purnawira-
wan Role in 
Party 
a. Founder  
b. Chair-
man on 
executive 
board 
c. Full 
domination 
of another 
board 
a. Recruit-
ment by 
ideological 
loyalty 
b. Ordinary 
member on 
national 
board 
c. Has part-
ial control 
of execu-
tive board 
as general 
secretary 
a. Founder 
b. Partial 
control of 
executive 
board as 
chairman 
and general 
secretary 
c. Domina-
tion of 
highest 
board 
a. Recruit-
ment for 
public 
office 
candidacy 
b. Ordinary 
member on 
board 
a. Full domina-
tion of highest 
board 
b. Partial con-
trol of executive 
board as vice 
chairman 
c. Control of 
party bodies and 
Party Wings 
organisation 
Survivabil-
ity 
Failure  
a. Traumat-
ic factor 
with previ-
ous military 
regime  
b. Electoral 
threshold 
2.5% in 
national 
vote 
c. Merger 
or regroup-
ing with 
other party 
of same 
type 
Survival 
a. Engage-
ment in 
party elites’ 
circulation  
b. Success 
in public 
office 
candidacy 
Success 
a. Success-
ful in 
election 
with total 
votes 
exceeding 
electoral 
threshold 
b. Recruit-
ment of 
moderate 
military 
figures  
c. Introduc-
tion of 
civilian 
politician 
exponent in 
strategic 
position 
Decline 
a. Pressed 
by domina-
tion of 
civilian 
politicians  
b. Exper-
tise in 
defence 
and intelli-
gence 
policy no 
longer 
needed by 
party 
Success 
a. Moderate 
military figures 
considered as 
equivocal in 
their leadership  
b. Combination 
of military 
discipline and 
popular demo-
cratic vision by 
civilian politi-
cians  
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Character-
istic 
Phase I Phase II Phase III 
Time 
Period 1998–2004 2004–2008 2008–2014 
Party Name HMP: PKPB, PPN, PKPI, 
PDK; CP: PPP, Golkar, 
PBB, PAN, PKB, PDIP 
SMP: Democrat, Hanura; 
CP: PDIP, Golkar 
MP: Gerindra; 
CP: Nasdem 
Prominent 
FMO 
Figure 
HMP: Gen. (ret) Hartono, 
Gen. (ret) Edi Sudrajat; 
CP: Maj. Gen. Theo Sjafei, 
Lt. Gen. Yunus Yosfiah, 
Gen. Budi Harsono 
SMP: Lt. Gen. (ret) Susilo 
Bambang Yudhoyono, 
Gen. (ret) Wiranto; CP: 
Gen. AM Hendropriyono, 
Lt. Gen. Sumarsono 
MP: Lt. Gen. 
(ret) Prabowo 
Subianto; CP: 
Gen. (ret) 
Endriartono 
Sutarto  
Source:  Developed and compiled by author. 
Most did not have the access required to mobilise the grassroots level, 
which was why purnawirawan joined civilian-controlled parties on an ad 
hoc basis. In none of the parties were purnawirawan given strategic or 
important positions on the national boards. 
The above analysis of the distribution and trends from the dataset 
reveals that a fragmentation of purnawirawan occurred during the demo-
cratic transition period (1998–2004). There are three explanations for 
what caused the purnawirawan diaspora among political parties. First, 
military elites who were not incorporated into Golkar failed to retain 
military support during the period of democratic transition – especially 
after Akbar Tanjung was chosen over General Edi Sudrajat, the former 
commander of the TNI, as a candidate for Golkar chairperson in 1998. 
Under Akbar’s leadership, Golkar significantly reduced the influence of 
military exponents; though some purnawirawan still held strategic posi-
tions on the central board (Chrisnandi and Priamarizki 2014). Military-
faction hardliners joined other parties, such as General (ret) Rudini, who 
became chairperson of the Mutual Assistance Families Association Party 
(Partai Musyawarah Kekeluargaan Gotong Royong, MKGR) – one of 
the Golkar’s supporting political organisations (Van Dijk 1994). Other 
notable members, such as General (ret) Edi Sudrajat, established the 
PKPI, which was also joined by General (ret) Try Sutrisno.  
Second, another faction of military exponents joined parties with 
which they shared (e.g. religious and nationalist) ideologies. Prominent 
figures of the nationalist faction – such as Major General (ret), Theo 
Syafei, and Lieutenant General (ret) AM Hendropriyono – chose the 
PDIP. Lieutenant General (ret) Yunus Yosfiah and Major General (ret) 
Andi M. Ghalib joined the Islamist United Development Party (Partai 
Persatuan Pembangunan, PPP), while Major General (ret) Syamsudin 
and Major General (ret) Soewarno Adiwidjojo became members of the 
PAN. As part of the nationalist or Islamic military factions, these indi-
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viduals were already part of non-Golkar networks and had real political 
power. However, they were under the control of civilians and had no 
significant influence on party policy. The only advantages of their roles 
were party electoral success and parliamentary seats. In Parliament they 
made significant contributions to constitutional amendments and mili-
tary reform by bridging political communication between the parties, 
Parliament, and the military. As Liddle (1996: 61) mentions, this was a 
legacy of the factionalisation of the armed forces during the New Order 
regime.  
Third, purnawirawan who joined the presidential cabinet as military 
representatives were able to build their own political parties, which they 
organised while holding office. An example was Yudhoyono, who built 
the Democratic Party while serving as a minister in Megawati Sukarno-
putri’s administration. 
In the 2004 general election, some purnawirawan-founded parties 
were able to survive despite not securing a significant number of seats in 
Parliament. The Democratic Party gained 7.45 per cent of the vote in its 
debut campaign, the 2004 election. In 2009 Hanura received 3.77 per 
cent of the vote in its first election, while Gerindra received 4.46 per cent. 
Somewhat surprisingly, Hanura received slightly fewer votes in the 2014 
election, while Gerindra secured the biggest share of votes by a purna-
wirawan-controlled party with 11.81 per cent.3 After realising that the 
party was highly electable, some purnawirawan left their parties and decid-
ed to join Gerindra. Another pull factor was the party’s leader, Prabowo 
Subianto, who was known for offering prestigious positions to purnawi-
rawan. Gerindra was committed to recruiting new purnawirawan members 
and did not limit its recruitment to one branch of the armed forces or 
former military-academy classmates. 
I use the term “civilian party” to distinguish between parties con-
trolled by civilian politicians and those controlled by purnawirawan. Civil-
ian-controlled parties had specific characteristics and primarily recruited 
purnawirawan to fill internal management positions. Meanwhile, purnawira-
wan-controlled parties consisted of highly militarist parties, semi-militarist 
parties, and militarist parties; all were based on military values, doctrine, 
and organisational models and were subject to authoritative centralised 
command. They also approached the family members of active military 
members and mobilised them during each election. In cases where purna-
wirawan party leaders and active military commanders were part of the 
                                                 
3  See Komisi Pemilihan Umum Republik Indonesia <www.kpu.go.id> (18 Au-
gust 2017). 
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same personal networks, these parties may have had direct relations with 
military organisations.  
Mudde (1996) categorised militarist parties as being on the extreme 
right. This kind of party was prevalent during the interwar period when 
parties were usually primordially based – for example, the Kuomintang 
(Guomindang) in China (Radek 1932). The existence of extreme-right 
parties in democracies is strongly influenced by the political culture in a 
country, such as in Turkey (Dagi 2008) and Israel (Kimmerling 1993; 
Ben-Eliezer 1998). The vulnerability of regimes during political and mili-
tary conflicts also contributes to the strengthening of militarism within 
political parties. In countries transitioning to democracy, however, mili-
tarism can be minimised to some degree by the presence of political 
actors who are capable of maintaining civilian control over politics. In 
situations where military actors have direct control over a political organ-
isation, the inclusion of militarist values, doctrines, and organisations is 
more likely. In the Indonesian case the pivotal political actors were not 
active military but rather purnawirawan – a group that introduced the 
military mindset to political parties. 
The democratisation period resulted in three phases of party devel-
opment in which the purnawirawan played an important role (see Table 2). 
In phase I (1999–2004) purnawirawan established new highly militarist 
parties. However, none gained a significant amount of votes in the elec-
tion. This was mainly due to the unfavourable political situation and 
strong public pressure emanating from the Reformasi movement. An-
other factor that affected the election was purnawirawan dominance at all 
levels of political parties’ central offices. Constituency bases were not 
widespread and only comprised military family members. Meanwhile, 
purnawirawan joining civilian-controlled parties found it easier to survive 
because their expertise made them valuable. In the period between 1998 
and 2004 the PDIP heavily recruited members with military backgrounds, 
posting them to the parliamentary commission for defence and security.  
In phase II the military’s role as a professional outfit under civilian 
control was confirmed, which was influenced by the military’s withdraw-
al from Parliament and the passing of Law No. 34/2004 on the TNI. 
Purnawirawan figures had learned from the failure of the highly militarist 
parties in the previous election and created a new party format which 
entailed substantial modifications to membership and party organisation. 
Before the 2004 and 2009 elections, the two main parties were the Dem-
ocratic Party and Hanura (the original semi-militarist party). In those 
parties purnawirawan recruited civilian politicians to participate in the 
party establishment process. The combination of moderate military lead-
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ership and the expansion of their constituency bases by civilian politi-
cians saw these parties garner adequate support. Civilian politicians also 
had a proportionately larger share of seats on the executive board. In this 
phase purnawirawan who joined civilian-controlled parties no longer had 
strategic positions and their roles were significantly less influential. Their 
membership in parties like the PAN, the PKB, and the PPP declined 
sharply. They only survived in the PDIP and Golkar due to their rela-
tionship with the parties’ elites. Several purnawirawan-created parties also 
emerged during this phase, such as the Archipelago Republic Party (Par-
tai Republika Nusantara, PRN) – which was established by Brigadier 
General (ret) Syarnubi and Brigadier General (ret) Husein Thaib – and 
the Democratic Nationhood Party (Partai Demokrasi Kebangsaan, 
PDK), which was a political vehicle for lower-ranking purnawirawan who 
had previously held social and political functions in the TNI. Colonel 
(ret) Iyer Sudaryana was the PDK’s chairperson, while Colonel (ret) 
Bahar Mallarangan, Colonel (ret) Tasno HP, and Lieutenant Colonel (ret) 
Haryanto were all on the executive board (Lansford 2015). Neither the 
PRN nor the PDK saw their candidates elected to Parliament.  
Phase III was marked by the establishment of Gerindra – a party 
which was attractive to purnawirawan and whose model of party organisa-
tion differed from those of the Democratic Party and Hanura. The main 
difference between Gerindra and its counterparts centred on the level of 
authority held by their respective boards of trustees. Both the Democrat-
ic Party and Hanura allocated board positions equally to purnawirawan 
and civilian politicians. Gerindra, however, gave full control of its board 
to purnawirawan, which were thus responsible for overseeing the imple-
mentation of party policy. Gerindra’s executive board, however, was 
predominantly filled by civilian politicians, with a few purnawirawan occu-
pying lower positions. In the 2009 election Gerindra successfully passed 
the threshold and then opted to send only civilian politicians to the DPR. 
In the 2014 election the party’s vote share saw it go from being the low-
est-ranked party to being the third-ranked party after the PDIP and Gol-
kar. 
Although Gerindra remains totally under the control of the advisory 
board, it is run by the executive board, which is dominated by civilian 
politicians. Between the 2007 and 2014 elections, Gerindra developed 
the new militarist-party model. The party passed an electoral threshold in 
the 2009 election and ensured it had representatives in Parliament. In the 
2014 elections they won the third most votes behind PDIP and Golkar. 
In 2012 other semi-militarist parties (similar to Hanura) were established. 
These parties also had a large number of purnawirawan in their central 
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offices. One of these parties, the Nasdem Party (Nasional Demokrat), 
was founded by the former Golkar member, Surya Paloh, with the full 
support of General (ret) Endriartono Sutarto and Admiral (ret) Tedjo 
Edhi (The Jakarta Post 2014). 
The Role of Purnawirawan in Party  
Development  
The phases of party development discussed above resulted in the emer-
gence of three types of political parties containing military-style organisa-
tion, military doctrines, and military networks. To examine the specific 
role and function of purnawirawan in party development and their contri-
butions within their parties, I conduct an analysis of the PDIP and Gol-
kar as representatives of the civilian party and compare them with the 
Democratic Party and Gerindra. 
Civilian Party: The PDIP and Golkar  
The PDIP and Golkar are the two major parties controlled by civilian 
politicians, even though Golkar was also formed during the New Order. 
Although the period of purnawirawan involvement varies, they can be 
described as loyal to their parties, especially in the PDIP. Theo Syafei 
was among those to serve as chairperson of the executive board and was 
also vice chairperson of the PDIP faction in the MPR from 1999 to 2004 
(The Jakarta Post 1999). Another notable member who had close relations 
with the chairperson is General (ret) AM Hendropriyono. The civilian-
controlled model in the PDIP was effective in selecting a purnawirawan 
network to occupy other strategic positions in the party’s central office. 
The selection of purnawirawan was carried out personally and centrally by 
the party chairperson. There did not appear to be any significant re-
cruitment through ordinary channels or the party’s established personal 
network. This condition enabled the party’s civilian elite to maintain 
civilian supremacy in the party. In these parties, purnawirawan were strate-
gically placed according to the party’s needs (e.g. access to networks, 
legislative and presidential election campaigns, etc.). Due to the difficulty 
in becoming part of the elite or party oligarchy, most purnawirawan saw 
the party as a political vehicle for getting nominated or winning elections.  
Purnawirawan who did not occupy elite positions chose to accept 
leadership positions and other roles that enabled them to take advantage 
of party bodies, which had significant roles in organising the masses in 
their working areas as well as in the daily political structure of the execu-
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tive board and party agency. In these roles purnawirawan were responsible 
for empowering the party’s constituent base. To make coordination with 
the central office more efficient, the head of the party bodies also served 
as a party board member. Overall, it was not easy for low-level purnawi-
rawan to achieve “mastery” of the party. They initially had to have a po-
litical investment in the party and then deal with influential civilian poli-
ticians in the long term.  
The roles of purnawirawan newcomers in the PDIP are easier to trace. 
The first is a consultative role, which enables those within the party 
management at the central office to provide policy input to the chairper-
son. Theo Sjafei held such a role as chairperson of the Cadre and Organ-
isation Division, which lays the foundations of the PDIP’s organising 
models. The second is a legislative role, which gives DPR members the 
opportunity to represent the DPR on the commissions concerned with 
defence and security, local government, and law and human rights. The 
PDIP placed a large number of purnawirawan in the DPR between 1999 
and 2009. 
The conditions in the PDIP differed greatly from those in Golkar, 
although the party was controlled by civilian politicians after 1998. The 
influence of purnawirawan in the party remained strong until 2005, but 
thereafter the civilian politicians from various party bodies and the polit-
ical factions within led to the traditional role of the military in the party’s 
controlling body being replaced. Some military members, like Prabowo 
Subianto, only sat as members on the advisory board and had no author-
ity to determine policies. The limited access to strategic positions result-
ed in significant levels of defection, especially to the Democratic Party.  
In Golkar there was an unwritten convention that if the chairperson 
was a military member, the secretary general had to be a civilian and vice 
versa. This combination was used to maintain the support (i.e. votes) of 
military families (Kompas 2004). Although the leadership of Akbar Tan-
jung and Jusuf Kalla retained strategic places for the purnawirawan on the 
executive board, the presence of military members diminished. By the 
end, the positions of purnawirawan on the party board also came under 
increasing pressure from civilian politicians. 
The traditional civilian–military combination in the Golkar leader-
ship disappeared during Aburizal Bakrie’s stewardship in 2010. Notable 
purnawirawan – such as General (ret) Luhut Pandjaitan, Major General 
(ret) Albert Inkiriwang, and Major General (ret) Sugiono Kadarisman – 
were merely placed on boards and their influence within the party gener-
ally declined. Meanwhile, civilian politicians were more evenly split in the 
elite faction dominated by purnawirawan, and each civilian politician who 
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held a position in central office had a significant power base among the 
party’s supporters, party organs, and other supporting organisations. 
Unlike the PDIP, Golkar is not bound by an ideology. The party is rela-
tively pragmatic, so purnawirawan can join and leave easily. Most purnawi-
rawan sought nominations to public office, especially as members of 
Parliament. This pragmatism was evident following Golkar’s failure un-
der Aburizal. Luhut Pandjaitan and Agus Widjojo got around 22 purnawi-
rawan with the rank of general to declare their support for Widodo dur-
ing the 2014 presidential election (Kompas 2014b); some even worked on 
Widodo and Jusuf Kalla’s successful campaign.  
Purnawirawan had two types of role within Golkar. The first was a 
representative role for military exponents who, from 1998 to 2004, still 
overwhelmingly voted for Golkar. During this period, Akbar Tanjung – 
who became the party chairperson – put purnawirawan in strategic posi-
tions (central office, advisory board, and general secretary). The second 
was a discretionary role, which was exercised through parliamentary posi-
tions awarded to former members of the TNI and the police, who dom-
inated the legislative process in the DPR. Having purnawirawan in these 
roles allowed Golkar to anticipate uneasy relations with military institu-
tions. 
Semi-Militarist Party: The Democratic Party 
The Democratic Party was the product of the second phase of party 
development. It learned valuable lessons from the collapse of highly 
militarist parties, which were created during the 1998–2004 era. The 
Democratic Party established mutual relationships with civilians and 
cooperated with politicians, social activists, academics, businesspeople, 
and representatives of student organisations. During the preparation of 
the central office structure, civilian groups had the opportunity to nomi-
nate purnawirawan representatives for executive member positions within 
the party’s central office. This resulted in a high degree of civilian control 
over purnawirawan and impacted the balance of power within the organi-
sation. This condition pushed the party to modify its core practice of 
strong military leadership and become more moderate. Under Colonel 
(ret) Hadi Utomo’s leadership from 2005 to 2010, purnawirawan con-
trolled the advisory board but no longer dominated the party’s executive 
board (Democrat Party Structure List 2005–2010). This configuration 
made the party more open and able to accept democratic values and to 
affirm its commitment to achieving political objectives through constitu-
tional mechanisms. The leadership combination of Hadi Utomo as 
chairperson and Marzuki Alie as general secretary greatly expanded the 
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party’s membership and culminated in success at the 2009 election. The 
involvement of purnawirawan proved critical, because military networks 
mobilised support for Yudhoyono’s campaign in 2009 – especially the 
Echo Team led by Marshal (ret) Djoko Suyanto (Kompas 2009).  
The role of purnawirawan could be split into three functions. The 
first function was the role of party controller, which was executed 
through the position of party chief or general secretary. Although the 
party was seen as a solid political organisation internally, it remained 
sensitive to political changes in society because input from civilian politi-
cians received serious attention. Moreover, civilian politicians had a 
strong bargaining position in the party. The second function was the 
distributional role, through which purnawirawan controlled the party, 
recruited new purnawirawan from their networks, and then launched them 
as candidates. The third function was the transformational role, which 
was used to instil the values of military organisation into the vision of the 
Democratic Party. However, this function was only effective during Hadi 
Utomo’s stewardship. Utomo expanded the network not only to include 
new political groups from across the political spectrum but also to previ-
ously established groups.  
Militarist Party: Gerindra Party 
Gerindra began creating its organisational structure with a view to win-
ning a seat at the 2009 election. The advisory board was the highest au-
thority in the party’s management structure. The executive board only 
implemented policies issued by the advisory board after gaining the 
mandate to run the party’s policy direction by the party congress. This 
was especially true after the extraordinary congress in September 2012, 
which created party policies that strengthened the position of the adviso-
ry board. The advisory board’s chairperson (Prabowo) and members 
consisted almost entirely of purnawirawan – among them was General (ret) 
Djoko Santoso, the former commander of the TNI. Meanwhile, the 
ranks of the executive board were largely controlled by civilian politicians 
and a small faction of purnawirawan, which included Vice Admiral (ret) 
Ferdinand Manengkei, a former member of the TNI/police parliamen-
tary faction and a party body head, and Colonel (ret) Dalkijo as deputy 
general secretary.  
Civilian politicians had no significant impact on the party’s major 
policies. The party’s management was mostly comprised of Prabowo 
loyalists in the army. The executive board had no control over the party 
bodies or party wings. Compared to the PDIP – in which the party bod-
ies coordinated with party officials at each level – Gerindra was more 
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centralised. The party’s constitution confirmed that the bodies and party 
wings were established by the executive board to carry out certain tasks. 
As for the party wing, the member composition was determined by the 
central board leadership in charge of those wings (Gerindra Constitution 
Article 7). The patronage system was another significant factor within 
the party’s management structure, with a dominant leader meaning that 
the party was centrally managed; this created a party oligarchy that tend-
ed to ignore the principles of democracy.  
Gerindra applied an organisational pattern that was similar to that 
of Golkar during the New Order. The highest authority was the chair-
person of the advisory board, which is the supreme leadership council of 
the party according to the constitution. The advisory board has the au-
thority to establish the constitutions of both the party and the party 
congress; to appoint the chairpersons of the executive board, the adviso-
ry board, and the board of experts; and to appoint cadres to public office 
until there is a recommended candidate for governor (Gerindra Constitu-
tion Article 19). Another party body is the party court (mahkamah partai), 
which is formed by the executive board. All personnel compositions for 
this court must be approved by the advisory board. Purnawirawan had a 
dominant role within the party structure during Prabowo’s tenure as 
chairperson. Lieutenant General (ret) Tohar Amin, the former com-
mander of the presidential guard (pasukan pengamanan presiden), also occu-
pied the strategic position of deputy chairperson of the executive board.  
During the initial recruitment period until 2012, Prabowo preferred 
to recruit from the army, especially those who came from the special 
forces unit (Kopassus) and its primary combat unit (Kostrad). After the 
extraordinary congress of 2012, recruitment was conducted in a large-
scale manner by including all military branches. Most purnawirawan who 
retired from military duty after 2004 were recruited as new party mem-
bers. These included General (ret) Suharto, a former commander of the 
Marine Corps, and Admiral (ret) Mokhlas Sidik, former chief of the 
Eastern Fleet (BeritaSatu 2012) – both of whom were navy recruits who 
were placed on the advisory board. The expansion of the recruitment 
pool beyond the army made Gerindra a shelter to a large extent. The 
party also received a large number of defectors (particularly from military 
families) from other parties, such as the Democratic Party and Golkar.  
Purnawirawan had two roles in Gerindra. The first was that of co-
optation, whereby they dominated the party’s hierarchy structure and 
weakened the bargaining position of civilian politicians. The second was 
a distributional role, which was similar to that in the Democratic Party. 
After the 2014 election, purnawirawan began to be nominated as candi-
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dates for the DPR legislature and for gubernatorial elections. The choice 
of purnawirawan for public office positions was a result of the party’s 
established system of distributing and arranging human resources. The 
distribution of public office nominations was followed by purnawirawan 
stewardship in party bodies, agencies, and party wings. Optimising the 
performance of the party through the party’s bodies and wings showed 
that Gerindra had the scope to extend and organise its constituency base 
to include many community groups.  
The emergence of militarist parties during Indonesia’s democratisa-
tion after 1998 was influenced by the presence of the traditional leader-
ship in the leader-centric parties, which survived by relying on the cha-
risma of their leaders and had clear traditional constituencies – for ex-
ample, the PDIP (nationalists) and the PKB (Sunni Muslims), both of 
which have a high degree of patronage. Mass parties that rely on charis-
matic leaders lack the capacity for good organisational management. 
Another factor that explains the emergence of militarist parties is the 
inclusion of purnawirawan, who brought the tradition of military organisa-
tion to party organisation. The combination of these two factors was 
present in various forms in each party. Militarist party models are also 
found in the Middle East (e.g. Lebanon’s Kataeb Party) and in Africa (e.g. 
South Africa’s ANC Party) (Lodge 2004). This type of party model gen-
erates loyal cadres. In the context of Indonesia’s democratisation, it is in 
high demand among emerging political parties and could easily be carried 
to extremes or lead to authoritarianism. 
In the case of Indonesia, militarist party types have two characteris-
tics specific to that country. First, party loyalty is built through political 
incentives. In the process of mobilising support for Yudhoyono during 
the presidential election, many purnawirawan were involved in the success 
team (tim sukses). They were given incentives, starting with being ap-
pointed to the central board. Most purnawirawan opted for a strategic 
position within a state enterprise or other state institutions (Tempo 2007). 
Second, militarist parties do not have clear social bases. Within such 
parties purnawirawan just carry out party programmes and promote them 
during elections. Militarist parties were organised to form a strategic 
sociopolitical and economic base without carefully screening their main 
support bases. The Democratic Party, for example, recruited from vari-
ous interest groups, community organisations, professional organisations, 
and politicians and selected for its elite circle (Tempo 2008). The goal was 
to have an elite representative in various societal organisations. A practi-
cal consequence of this decision was that some members of the elite 
came from societal organisations and represented them within the party, 
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using their position as an opportunity to mobilise their organisation 
more easily. 
The support of societal organisations was also achieved through 
party wings and by maximising control of the organs of special interest 
groups. For example, Gerindra created organs that could reach all exist-
ing social forces and also had direct contact with professional associa-
tions and religious organisations. This could be seen in its co-optation of 
the Indonesian Farmers Association, the largest farmers’ organisation in 
Indonesia. The party also benefited from co-opting other groups that 
had a large number of members in labour organisations. This process 
was more personalised in instances where the party elite exploited per-
sonal ties with leaders of labour groups (Kompas 2014a). Gerindra’s strat-
egy was more effective than that adopted by the Democratic Party be-
cause Gerindra’s party wings and networks were well institutionalised. 
The votes it obtained from its socially and culturally broader constituen-
cy base contributed significantly to its strong electoral performance. 
Conclusion 
Democratic instruments enabled purnawirawan to join, set up, and manage 
political parties by incorporating militarist values and doctrines into party 
organisation. The existence of political channels for purnawirawan mitigat-
ed the risk of military-sponsored coups by providing retired military 
elites a route into politics. Their political participation within parties 
shows that, in the case of Indonesia, military reform can be accom-
plished through opening political channels for military retirees. However, 
the political parties that the purnawirawan founded had a high degree of 
militarism, which seriously impeded democratisation. 
As this article has shown, purnawirawan proved to be a formidable 
political force: they had the ability to build political parties, manage in-
ternal conflicts, and win votes at elections. They also effectively exploit-
ed the vulnerability of civilian politicians, who had failed to build more 
accountable parties and properly manage internal conflicts. This study 
contributes to the discussion on how the success of democratic consoli-
dation in post-authoritarian countries depends on civilian control of the 
military. The consolidation of civilian control became an essential pre-
requisite for the process of eliminating military influence in politics in 
Indonesia. Specifically, it enabled democratisation to run relatively safely 
without the threat of political conflicts escalating. Furthermore, purnawi-
rawan were fully engaged in party development, contributing to its 
uniqueness. The thing that most stands out with regard to purnawirawan is 
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the flexibility they have exhibited in accepting and adapting to the politi-
cal and social changes brought about by democratisation.  
This study also contributes insights into the process of party devel-
opment in new democracies. The phenomenon by which parties are 
established and survive elections cannot be separated from the role of 
political actors with military backgrounds and who had substantial con-
trol of politics during authoritarian periods. This occurrence contrasts 
with some related findings for Eastern Europe, which indicate that par-
ties are driven by political actors and businesspeople. The main parties 
controlled by purnawirawan in Indonesia are managed by a strong element 
of militarism. Such parties tend to be vulnerable to becoming soft-
authoritarian organisations. It is worth noting that militarist party models 
can be developed rapidly in order to influence democratisation and gain 
legislative seats. 
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